Type 2 diabetes; elderly; cognitive deficit; cognitive flexibility; executive functions Resumen

Through meditation, people become aware of what happens in the body and mind, accepting the present experiences as they are and getting a better understanding of the true nature of things. Meditation practices and its inclusion as an intervention technique, have generated great interest in identifying the brain mechanisms through which these practices operate. Different studies suggest that the practice of meditation is associated with the use of different neural networks as well as changes in brain structure and function, represented in higher concentration of gray matter structures at the hippocampus, the right anterior insula, orbital frontal cortex (OFC) and greater involvement of the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC). These and other unrelated studies, shows the multiple implications of the regular practice of mindfulness in the structures and functions of the brain and its relation to certain observable and subjective states in people who practice it. Such evidence enabling the inclusion of mindfulness in psychological therapy where multiple applications have been developed to prove its effectiveness in treating affective and emotional problems, crisis management, social skills, verbal creativity, addiction and craving management, family and caregivers stress of dementia patients and others. However, neuropsychological rehabilitation has no formal proposals for intervention from these findings. The aim of this paper is to propose use of Mindfulness in neuropsychological rehabilitation process, taking the positions and theory of A.R. Luria.

Senescence-associated β-galactosidase activity in the in vitro ovarian stromal fibroblasts

Introduction: A growing biological research field is the cellular senescence, a mechanism that has been associated, under certain circumstances, with malignant transformation. Given the high incidence of ovarian cancer and its main origin from the ovarian surface epithelium, as well as the possibility that an epithelial-mesenchymal transition occurs, we evaluated both the in vitro growth of stromal fibroblasts from the ovarian cortex and their β-galactosidase activity at pH 6, enzyme whose expression is considered as a marker of replicative senescence. Methods: 48 samples of ovarian cortical fibroblasts from donors without a history of cancer were serially cultured until the end of their replicative life. β-galactosidase activity at pH 6 was quantified in each passage by the chemiluminiscent method. As control, we used ovarian epithelial cell cultures from the same donors. The enzyme activity was also evaluated in fibroblasts previously induced to senescence by exposure to hydrogen peroxide. Results: The analysis of the enzyme activity and the replicative capacity taken together showed that the fibroblast cultures reached the senescent state at passages 4-5, as what happened with the control epithelial cells. Fibroblasts induced to senescence showed high variability in the values of enzymatic activity. Conclusions: The similarity between both types of cells in reaching the senescent state deserves to be taken into account in relation to the epithelialmesenchymal transition that has been proposed to explain their behavior in the genesis of cancer arising from ovarian surface epithelium. Low β-galactosidase activity values at pH 6 would suggest possible inactivation of the response pathways to oxidative stress.

¿Tenemos libre albedrío? Objeciones empíricas y filosóficas a Benjamin Libet.

Benjamin Libet ha argumentado que cambios específicos en la actividad electroencefalográfica del córtex cerebral son registrados varios cientos de milisegundos antes que las personas tengan la intención consciente para actuar. Según Libet este hallazgo prueba que los movimientos voluntarios se inician de manera inconsciente. Siendo así, pone en duda nuestra percepción de libre albedrío según la cual nosotros somos iniciadores conscientes de nuestras acciones voluntarias. En este artículo haré objeciones empíricas a su modelo experimental argumentando que Libet no mide en realidad lo que él cree que está midiendo y, que el uso de electroencefalografía con electrodo de registro en cuero cabelludo no suministra datos fiables que permitan correlacionar cambios de la actividad cerebral y fenómenos psíquicos. También haré objeciones teóricas a las conclusiones filosóficas derivadas de sus experimentos, argumentado que la acción simple (mover el dedo) no puede ser una acción paradigmática para estudiar libre albedrío y que Libet al no estudiar la naturaleza de las intenciones distales ni su probable rol causal en la formación de intenciones proximales, no puede demostrar que el cerebro decide inconscientemente iniciar la acción. Concluyo que Libet nunca llega a probar que no actuamos por nuestro propio libre albedrío.